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A Comparative Analysis of the Ohio
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Constitutional Rights Act
IT IS WELL KNOWN that the Supreme Court decisions of the last
decade have placed in question the adequacy of all phases of state
criminal procedure. A great deal of reform has been necessitated in
this area by the expansion of procedural due process requirements
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.' Although most of the
states have made the necessary changes in their investigative, arraign-
ment, and trial practices, in only a few states2 has there been a concur-
rent expansion of postconviction remedies suitable to protect an ac-
cused's federal constitutional rights.'
Because many alleged violations of these rights are not apparent
on the face of the record, the direct appellate process does not pro-
vide an appropriate forum for their vindication. On the other hand,
constitutional questions have usually not been cognizable in state
collateral proceedings such as habeas corpus and coram nobis
Thus, in several states convicted persons have been forced to seek
collateral relief by way of federal habeas corpus. This has led to the
federal preemption of some state supreme courts as courts of last
resort in criminal cases.'
An increasing number of states are attempting to eliminate the
necessity for federal interference with their administration of crimi-
nal justice. Statutes' or rules of court have been adopted which
1 See generally Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L REV. 945(1964); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federal-
ism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961).
2 California is typical of the states which have taken such action. See In re Ali,
230 Cal. App. 2d 585, 41 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1964); In re McCoy, 32 Cal. 2d 73, 194
P.2d 531 (1948); Granucci, Review of Criminal Convictions by Habeas Corpus in
California, 15 HASTINGS LJ. 189 (1963).
8 Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108
U. PA. L Rv. 461, 465-66 (1960).
4 For a discussion of the inadequacies of these remedies, see the prefatory note to
the UNIFORm PosT-CONVICTION PROCmDuRE AcT, 9B UNIFORm LAWS ANN. 344,
345-46 (1957).
5 See Reitz, supra note 3, at 467.
6ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 122-1 to -7 (1964); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1507 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, S§ 5502-08 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 645A-J (Supp. 1965); Neb. Laws 1965, ch. 145, at 486; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15-217 to -222 (1965); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510-.680 (1961); Pa. Laws
1965, No. 554, at 1398. WYO. STAT. ANN. 5§ 7-408.1-.8 (Supp. 1965).
7 ALASKA R. CRnM P. 35; CoLO. R. CRnL P. 35; DEL. SUPER. CT. (C im.) R.
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permit a prisoner who claims that his conviction was obtained by a
denial of due process to petition the court in which he was convicted
for a hearing on his allegations.8 The principal distinction between
such a hearing and an appeal is that in the former proceeding the
court is not limited to the record in its determination of the merit of
the petitioner's claims. These measures, usually known as postcon-
viction hearing acts, not only obviate the necessity of seeking similar
relief by way of federal habeas corpus but, in most cases, also pre-
clude such applications until state relief has been denied.9
In 1965, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Amended Senate
Bill No. 383,10 enabling prisoners to obtain this type of relief in the
Ohio courts. The purposes of this Note are: (1) to summarize re-
cent developments regarding state postconviction remedies; (2) to
analyze the Postconviction Determination of Constitutional Rights
Act" and compare it with similar legislation enacted in other states;
(3) to examine the Ohio cases in which the act has been interpreted
or applied; and (4) to offer suggestions directed toward its most
effective implementation.
I. COLLATERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
IN THE STATE COURTS
A. The Mandate of Young v. Ragen
Federal habeas corpus has been available to state prisoners since
1867.12 In 1944, however, in Ex parte Hawk," the United States
Supreme Court limited the issuance of the writ to those applicants
who have successfully exhausted their procedural remedies in the
state courts. The restriction was based upon the traditional hesi-
tancy of the federal judiciary to review matters not finally adjudi-
cated by the state courts. Later, the Court was forced to recognize
35; FLA. R. GRIM. P. 1; KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42; MO. R. CRIM. P. 27.26; N.J. RULES
3:10A-1 to -13 (Supp. 1965).
8 See generally Meador, Accomodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post-
conviction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964); Foth and Palmer, Post Conviction Motions
Under the Kansas Revised Code of Civil Procedure, 12 KAN. L. REV. 493 (1964); Mer-
rill, Federal Habeas Corpus and Maryland Post-Conviction Remedies, 24 MD. L. REv.
46 (1964); Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 154 (1965); Collins & Neil, The Oregon Post-
conviction Hearing Act, 39 ORE. L REv. 337 (1960); Note 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 617
(1965); Raper, Post Conviction Remedies, 19 WYO. L.J. 213 (1965).
928 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964). See note 13 infra.
10 Enacting OHIO REV. CODE 5§ 295 3.21-.24.
11 Ibid. This is the full tide of Amended Senate Bill No. 383.
1215 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964).
1 3 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). The Hawk decision has been codified
in 15 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964). See also Brown v. Allen 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953).
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the fact that several states had no common law or statutory provi-
sions for an evidentiary determination of an alleged infringement of
state or federal constitutional rights after the prisoner was con-
victed.14 Such a determination could be obtained only by federal
habeas corpus. 5 Federal prisoners, however, could challenge their
convictions on constitutional grounds without seeking relief under
the writ. 6
In order to focus the states' attention upon the disparity between
state and federal postconviction remedies, the Hawk rule was rede-
fined in the case of Young v. Ragen.' In Young, the petitioner
had been convicted of burglary in an Illinois circuit court and
sentenced to prison. One year later, he applied to that court for a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his conviction had been
obtained in violation of the fourteenth amendment. His peti-
tion was denied without a hearing. The Illinois Attorney General
conceded in his oral argument before the Supreme Court that Illi-
nois had no procedural device by which a convicted person could
obtain an evidentiary hearing on allegations of a denial of federal
constitutional rights. The Court found that writ of error and writ of
error coram nobis were inadequate. Further, an application for
habeas corpus could attack only the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court or the excessiveness of the sentence imposed. It was argued,
however, that the Court need not consider the question of the ade-
quacy of postconviction remedies in Illinois because recent decisions
in the supreme court of that state indicated that the grounds for
habeas relief were being expanded.
The Court held that the Hawk rule was founded upon the as-
sumption that the state remedies available to challenge the validity
of a conviction were adequate for that purpose."8 In the absence of
suitable local remedies, the reason for the rule - federal reluctance
to consider issues which were not determined in the state proceed-
ings - would no longer exist and federal habeas would issue."9
The fact that the burden of supplying such a remedy would be
heavy was recognized but held not to be persuasive.2" Because of
the possibility that petitioner might be entitled to adequate relief in
14 See Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
'r 28 U.S.C. 5 2241 (1964).
16 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
17 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
18Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949).
19 Id. at 238.
2 0 Id. at 239.
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the Illinois courts, the Court declined to rule on his right to seek
federal habeas without an exhaustion of his state "remedies." Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson concluded, however, that "if there is no post-
trial procedure by which federal rights may be vindicated in Illinois,
we wish to be advised of that fact upon remand of this case.' 21
While the Court made no express commands in the Young
decision, the mandate implicit in its discussion regarding the ade-
quacy of state remedies was dear: the federal courts would not inter-
vene in the administration of criminal justice at the state level if
and only if the state courts provided relief similar to that available
in federal courts. Otherwise, federal habeas corpus would issue to
provide a forum for the adjudication of alleged deprivations of
constitutional rights.
Illinois' response to the mandate was almost immediate. The
same year Young was decided, the legislature of that state enacted
the first state statute under which a conviction could be collaterally
attacked on constitutional grounds.2" The North Carolina statute
which was adopted in 1951 was admittedly "modeled" after the
Illinois law.23 The following year, rules of court with similar provi-
sions were adopted in Delaware and Missouri.2" In 1958, Mary-
land25 enacted a modified version of the Uniform Postconviction
Procedure Act,2" followed by Oregon in 1959. Other states which
adopted new legislation or rules of court to provide similar relief
before 1963 were Colorado, Wyoming," Alaska, and Kentucky. 9
B. Restatement of the Mandate
On March 18, 1963 when the Court decided Fay v. Noia 0 and
Townsend v. Sain, 1 the mandate of Young was restated, expanded,
and clarified. In Fay, the Court ruled on three questions of primary
importance with respect to the availability of federal habeas corpus
21 Ibid.
22 Ill. Laws 1949, § 1-7, at 722.
23N.C. Laws 1951, ch. 1083, § 1.
2Dm.. SuPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 35; Mo. F- CRM. P. 27.26.
25 Md. Laws 1958, ch. 44, §§ 654A to J.
2 6 UNIFORM PosTcoNvIcTioN PROCEDURE AcT § 1-7, 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
344, 352-57 (1957). Arkansas adopted the act in 1957 but repealed it two years later.
See 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 344 (1957).
27 Ore. Laws 1959, ch. 636, §§ 1-20.
2 8 COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35; Wyo Laws 1961, ch. 63, §§ 1-8.
2 9 ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35; KY. R. GlIM. P. 11A2.
30 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
31372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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to state prisoners. First, the Court considered the contention that
federal habeas would not issue when the applicant had failed to
pursue state remedies available to attack his conviction before the
time limitations attached to those remedies had expired. In response
to this argument, the Court reviewed in detail the history of the
Great Writ both at common law and in American constitutional
law. It was pointed out that "the breadth of the federal courts'
power of independent adjudication on habeas corpus stems from the
very nature of the writ, and conforms with the classic English prac-
tice."32  From this historic background of independent jurisdiction,
the Court concluded that state procedural limitations could not limit
the scope of federal habeas relief. That relief would be denied only
when state remedies were available at the time the petition was filed
in the district court.
Second, the Court considered the soundness of the doctrine of
Darr v. Burford."4 In that case, the Court had carried the notion of
comity between state and federal courts to its logical extreme by
holding that federal habeas petitions would not be considered until
and unless the applicant had sought and been denied certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court. 5 The Court pointed out that the
Darr decision had been justly criticized, and that it had "proved only
to be an unnecessarily burdensome step in the orderly processing of
the federal claims of those convicted of state crimes."3" The large
number of futile and unartfully drawn applications for certiorari
which were submitted to comply with the decision required that it
be overruled."
Finally, Mr. Justice Brennan sought to limit the scope of the
Court's opinion regarding the failure to exhaust state remedies.
Although the federal courts were not required to consider them-
selves bound by limitations attached to the invocation of state appel-
late procedures, federal authority to overlook an applicant's failure
to comply with procedural requirements might not be exercised
where the petitioner was guilty of bad faith. He concluded that
"the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an
32 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1963).
33 Id. at 435.
34 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
35 ld. at 217. Ohio prisoners, however, did not have to comply with this require-
ment because of the absence of suitable remedies in the Ohio courts. See Mattox v.
Sacks, 369 U.S. 656 (1962).
36 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437 (1963).
37 Ibid.
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applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the
state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies."
'
While Fay was chiefly concerned with the federal courts' power
to grant and the state prisoner's right to obtain habeas corpus,
Townsend v. Sain 9 focused upon the nature and extent of the relief
available to habeas applicants. The petitioner in that case had been
convicted of murder. After several appeals to both state and fed-
eral courts, he sought a writ of habeas corpus in an Illinois District
Court. On appeal from that court's denial of relief, the court of
appeals held that the scope of the district court's inquiry in habeas
proceedings was limited to the undisputed portions of the record.
In Townsend's case, the undisputed portions of the record did not
entitle him to relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
view that decision.
Careful consideration was given to the limitations placed upon
the district court by the court of appeals. However, on the basis of
the decision in Fay that federal habeas jurisdiction was independent
of and thus not controlled by state procedures, the Court held that
federal courts were empowered to conduct a hearing de novo in their
adjudication of all petitions for relief."0 The most important aspect
of the decision, however, was the ruling that this power could ripen
into a duty under certain circumstances:
We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing
... : If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved
in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it ap-
pears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant
a full and fair fact hearing.4 '
38 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). Mr. Justice Clark, in his dissenting
opinion, predicted that "there can be no question but that a rash of new applications
from state prisoners will pour into the federal courts, and 98% of them will be frivo-
lous, if history is any guide." Id. at 445. He went on to say that even before the Fay
decision, the number of habeas applications filed by state prisoners in federal courts
had increased tenfold in a five year period. Id. at 446.
39 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
4 0 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
41 Id. at 313. By so holding, the Court implicitly overruled the so-called "adequate
state ground" theory expressed in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In that case,
it had been held that:
[W]here the state [court] action was based on an adequate state ground, no
further examination is required, unless no state remedy for the depriviation
of federal constitutional rights ever existed. . . . Furthermore, where there
is material conflict of fact in the transcript of evidence as to deprivations of
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The effect of Fay and Townsend was to confer both a benefit
and a burden upon state and federal courts. The benefit stemmed
from the reasonably clear exposition of the postconviction proce-
dures which would satisfy the Court's standards of due process, in
addition to the clarification of federal-state relations in this area.
The burden was imposed by the restatement of the mandate that
states be prepared to meet and adequately handle the inevitable
increase in applications for postconviction relief, and, particularly
with regard to state criminal procedures, that the states provide
methods by which a convicted person might collaterally attack his
conviction on federal constitutional grounds.
Since 1963, there has been much legislative and judicial reform
of state postconviction procedures. In that year, Florida and New
Jersey enacted rules of court providing collateral relief from uncon-
stitutionally obtained convictions,42 and statutes to the same effect
were adopted in Maine and Kansas. 3 In 1965, the Nebraska legis-
lature approved an act similar to that subsequently enacted by the
Ohio General Assembly.44 Before that approval, however, a Ne-
braska prisoner who claimed that his conviction was obtained in
violation of due process had petitioned for certiorari in the Supreme
Court. The reason given by the Court for granting petitioner's re-
quest to hear Case v. Nebraska45 was "'to decide whether the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that the States afford state prisoners
some adequate corrective process for the hearing and determination
of claims of violation of federal constitutional guarantees."4
Because of the action taken by the Nebraska legislature, the
Court declined to answer the question. In light of the Young,
Fay, and Townsend cases, however, there can be little doubt that the
court was prepared to hold that due process required the states to
provide prisoners with a local "corrective process." As previously
indicated,4  Mr. Justice Clark was opposed to the majority opinion in
Fay because he felt that the decision would only add to the plethora
of habeas petitions filed in the federal courts. In his concurring
constitutional rights, the District Court may properly depend upon the state's
resolution of the issue. Id. at 458.
42 FA. R. CRIM. P. 1; N.J. RULES 3:10A-1 to-13.
4 3 Me. Laws 1963, ch. 310, § 1; Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 60-1507.
4 4 Neb. Laws 1965, ch. 145, §§ 1-5, at 486-87.
45381 U.S. 336 (1965).
4 6 Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965).
4 7 See note 38, supra.
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opinion in Case, he expressed his approval of Nebraska's enactment
of a postconviction relief statute by stating:
Believing that the practical answer to the problem is the enact-
ment by the several States of postconviction remedy statutes I ap-
plaud the action of Nebraska. This will enable prisoners to "air
out" their claims in the state courts and will stop the rising conflict
presently being generated between federal and state courts ...
I hope that the various States will follow the lead of Illinois,
Nebraska, Maryland, North Carolina, Maine, Oregon and Wyom-
ing in providing this modern procedure for testing federal claims
in the state courts and thus relieve the federal courts of this ever-
increasing burden.48
Mr. Justice Brennan, who had written the majority opinion in
Fay, took this opportunity to observe that "if adequate state proce-
dures, presently all too scarce, were generally adopted, much would
be done to remove the irritant of participation by the federal district
courts in state criminal procedures."4  With respect to the essential
elements of "adequate state procedures," he said:
The procedure should be swift and simple and easily invoked.
It should be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all federal con-
stitutional claims. In light of Fay v. Noia . . . it should eschew
rigid and technical doctrines of forfeiture, waiver, or default...
It should provide for full fact hearings to resolve disputed factual
issues, and for compilation of a record to enable federal courts to
determine the sufficiency of those hearings. . . . It should provide
for decisions supported by opinions, or fact findings and conclu-
sions of law, which disclose the grounds of decision and the resolu-
tion of disputed facts. Provision for counsel to represent prisoners
... would enhance the probability of effective presentation and a
proper disposition of prisoners' claims.50
This, then, was the state of the law when, on July 12, 1965, the
Ohio General Assembly bestowed its final approval on Amended
Senate Bill No. 383. Nine days later, Ohio became the sixteenth
state to enact a statute or rule of court designed to provide postcon-
viction relief to state prisoners similar to that available in the
federal courts.5'
II. THE ACT
Before 1965, Ohio's response to the mandate had been lethargic
at best. Since this state never recognized the writ of error coram
48 Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1965).
49 Id. at 345-46.
50 ld. at 346-47. See Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 945,
958-59 (1964).
51 The Pennsylvania statute was approved on January 25, 1966 and became ef-
fective on March 1, 1966.
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nobis, 2 the only procedural remedy available in the Ohio courts to
attack the validity of a sentence collaterally was habeas corpus.5"
The writ was restricted to its traditional function - to inquire into
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court or to determine whether its
sentence was void.54 The effect of this narrow application was that
a prisoner who desired to challenge his conviction on constitutional
grounds without being limited to the contents of the record was
forced to do so in a federal court.
As the number of habeas applications to the Ohio District
Courts increased, and as the echo of the mandate became more
audible to the ears of the Ohio judiciary, the scope of habeas corpus
was expanded to provide a local forum for an evidentiary adjudica-
tion of federal constitutional questions.55 When Amended Senate
Bill No. 383 became law, however, the restrictions formerly attached
to habeas relief were restored."
It should be stated at the outset that the act, like most of the
other statutes and rules,57 is substantively similar 'to the federal
statute.5 This fact raises an interesting question: what will be the
effect upon the Ohio judiciary of past and future interpretations of
section 2255 by the federal courts.59
A. Persons Entitled to Relief
The act provides that a postconviction hearing is available to "a
prisoner in custody and under sentence."6  The language of this
section seems to limit proceedings instituted under the act to attacks
upon judgments for which the petitioner is presently imprisoned.
However, on conviction, an habitual criminal could, in theory at
least, challenge a prior conviction because its invalidity would affect
52 State v. Hayslip. 90 Ohio St. 199, 107 N.E.2d 335 (1914); State v. Chapman,
159 N.E.2d 374 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
53 Ex parte Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426 (1874).
54 In re Burson, 152 Ohio St. 375, 89 N.E.2d 651 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
969 (1950).
55 Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St 2d 4, 210 N.E.2d 885 (1965).
56 Ibid. See text accompanying notes 133-34, infra.
57The following states have substantially reenacted the federal statute: Alaska,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Nebraska. See notes
5-6 supra.
5828 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
59 See text accompanying notes 143-44, inWra.
60 OsHO RnV. CODE § 2953.21.
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his sentence under the Ohio Habitual Criminal Act.6 Further, it is
questionable whether persons on probation or parole would be en-
titled to file a petition under this section.62 A majority of the states
have imposed similar restrictions upon the right to seek relief. "3 In
two states,64 however, the language of the statutes states that the
petitioner must be imprisoned in the penitentiary. A few states65
permit any convicted person to file a petition.
B. Grounds for Relief
A petition for a postconviction hearing filed in an Ohio court
must allege that the conviction was obtained by a denial of the pris-
oner's state or federal constitutional rights.66 There is no indication
that relief will be granted for errors traditionally cognizable in ap-
plications for habeas corpus. Thus, the assumption is warranted
that the General Assembly intended the act to supplement rather
than replace the remedies available under the writ. The effect is
that in some cases habeas would be a more appropriate remedy than
a postconviction hearing." This is not the rule in most states. For
example, a petition filed under the North Carolina statute" may
allege the lack of jurisdiction of the sentencing court or the exces-
siveness of the sentence imposed in addition to an infringement of
constitutional rights. It is said that the statute "comprehends and
takes the place of all other common-law and statutory remedies
which have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of
incarceration.. . and shall be used in lieu thereof.
69
6 1 OHIo REV. CODE § 2961.11. The act would probably change the result of cases
such as Maloney v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 84, 186 N.E.2d 728 (1962).
62Bat see Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), where the Court answered
this question in the affirmative with respect to the federal statute.
6 3 See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1507 (1964); Cf. Pa. Laws 1965, No.
554, § 3 (b), at 1398, which provides that a petition may be filed by prisoners who are
incarcerated, on probation, or on parole.
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1964); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.1 (Supp.
1965).
6 5 See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.510 (1961).
66 OHIo REv. CODE § 2953.21. The antithesis of this general provision is found
in the Pennsylvania statute where thirteen specific grounds for relief are enumerated.
See Pa. Laws 1965, No. 554, § 3(c), at 1398-99.
67 An attack upon the discretion of the judge to impose consecutive sentences is an
example. This dichotomy could be confusing to prisoners, although few will be aware
of the elements necessary for the proper invocation of the trial court's jurisdiction or
the imposition of a valid sentence. However, the problem can be avoided by an ex-
amination of the petition's substance rather than its form in determining the exact na-
ture of the relief sought.
68 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (1965).
69 Ibid.
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C. Pleadings and Testimony
Some of the statutes and rules include specific requirements and
prohibitions regarding the pleadings filed in the sentencing court.
The obvious purpose of these provisions is to enable the court to
obtain a complete and accurate record of the particular case as
rapidly as possible in order to facilitate the disposition of the peti-
tion. Other states, like Ohio, require only that the petition or
motion be filed in the sentencing court "stating the grounds relied
upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the sentence. 70
(1) Contents of the Petition.-In several states,71 the peti-
tioner is required to enumerate all prior proceedings instituted to
attack his conviction. The same states prohibit the inclusion of
argument and citations to authorities, 72 although a few provide that
such material may be submitted in a separate document.73 In addi-
tion, a few states74 require that affidavits, records, and other docu-
ments in support of the allegations in the petition must be attached
thereto or their absence explained. Most states, like Ohio, require
that the prisoner verify the truth of his allegations by affidavit."m
These specific requirements would appear to be more desirable
than general statutory language regarding the contents of the peti-
tion or motion. However, since the bulk of requests for relief are
drafted without the assistance of counsel,7" it is necessary that the
courts liberally allow amendments if the requirements are disre-
garded. In the end, then, such provisions could be as productive of
delay as those which are less specific.
(2) Amendment and Withdrawal.-Eight states expressly per-
mit the petitioner to amend his petition,"' and in all but one of these
states a petition may be withdrawn prior to judgment." The rest
of the statutes and rules are silent with respect to these matters,
7 0 OHIO REv. CODE § 2953.21.
71 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5504 (1964); Mn. RULES BK41
(a) (5).
72 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-2 (1964).
73 ORE. RV. STAT. § 138.580 (1961).
74WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.2 (Supp. 1965).
75 Oio REv. CoDE 2953.21. See also N.J. RULES 3:10A-8. Cf. FLA. I.lum
P. 1.
76 See text accompanying notes 95-100 infra.
77
ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 38, § 122-5 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5503 (1964);
AI. RULE BK41(d) (5); N.J. RULES 3:1OA.-9 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15-217 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.610 (1961); Pa. Laws 1965, No. 554, § 7 at
1400; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.5 (Supp. 1965). See Swepston v. United States,
227 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mo. 1964).
78N.j. RULEs 3:10A-1 to -13 (Supp. 1965).
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although it may be assumed that this silence would not limit the
discretionary powers of the courts involved. It is interesting to note
that in North Carolina, the withdrawal of a petition operates as a
waiver of all allegations included. 9
(3) Answer.-A majority of the states require that the prose-
cuting attorney file an answer or motion to dismiss in opposition to
all petitions.8" The purpose of this practice is to present clearly the
issues involved. Its value, however, is questionable in light of the
fact that the appropriate response will usually be a demurrer. In
addition, it is possible that the court might be inclined not to order a
hearing8' on the basis of all the pleadings, when the issues raised
should be determined in such an adversary proceeding. The act
provides that the prosecutor must answer only when the court orders
a hearing. 2
(4) Testimony.-The act states that the testimony of the pris-
oner and other witnesses may, if a hearing is held, be offered by
deposition. 3 This provision raises the question whether this is the
exclusive means of presenting testimony or whether additional
methods may be permitted in the discretion of the court. The latter
alternative seems most likely in light of the language in the same
section which authorizes the court to conduct a hearing without re-
quiring that the petitioner be present.8" None of the statutes or
rules include restrictions upon the presentation of testimony or
other evidence.8"
D. Hearing
A prisoner who files a petition under the act is not entitled to a
hearing upon his allegations as a matter of right. A hearing will
not be held if "the petition and the files and records of the case
show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is entitled to
no relief."86  Most states have similar provisions.8" The right to a
7 9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-220 (1965).
8 0 See, e.g., Ky. R. CluM. P. 11.42; MD. RULES BK43(a).
81 See Gregori v. United States, 243 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1957). See also text ac-
companying notes 86-94 infra.
82 0Hio Rnv. CODE § 2953.21.
8 3 OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.22. See Kimbrough v. United States, 226 F.2d 485
(5th Cir. 1955).
84 0Hio REv. CODE 5 2953.22.
85 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-6 (1964).
8 6 HIo REv. CODE § 2953.21.
87 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5506 (1964); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 11.42. See
Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1959).
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hearing is expressly recognized in only two states,88 although the
language of three other statutes seems to impliedly recognize such a
right.8
9
In Townsend v. Sain,9 the Court recognized the fact that many
petitions for federal relief are wholly without merit. The district
courts, therefore, are not obliged to conduct a hearing in all cases
where the state courts fail to do so, but only when an issue of fact
raised in a petition for habeas corpus has not been and cannot be
determined in any other forum. Thus, the power of discretionary
dismissal of petitions was doubtless intended to obviate the burden-
some task of listening to frivolous allegations. If no factual issues
are presented, the courts need not waste time by giving the petitioner
a second day in court. In a subsequent case, however, the Court
held that any doubts as to the necessity for ordering a hearing should
be resolved in the prisoner's favor."1
The act provides that the presence of the prisoner at the hearing,
if one is held, is not required but is within the discretion of the
court. 2 This is the rule in most states,"3 although two statutes
recognize the petitioner's right to be present if questions of fact are
argued and testimony presented.94
B. Counsel
The act includes a provision that "a court in which a petition is
filed... may appoint and fix the compensation of counsel .... .""
8 8 M!rD. RULES BK44(a); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 138.590(4), .620 (1961). In
Maryland, rule BK44(c) provides that "the hearing may be before any judge except
a judge who sat at the trial at which the petitioner was convicted, unless the petitioner
assents to a hearing before such judge." But see Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348
(4th Cir. 1949).
8 9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-6,-7 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217.1
(1965); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.6 (Supp. 1965). Although the Delaware rule
does not indicate that a hearing must be held in all cases, the cases have so interpreted
it. See Jones v. Anderson, 54 Del. 587, 183 A.2d 177 (1962). See also Owens v.
State, 398 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1965).
90 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
91 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). See note 123 infra.
9 2
wOO REV. CODE § 2953.22.
93 ALASKA R- CRIM. P. 35; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.6 (Supp. 1965); Cf. Pa.
Laws 1965, No. 554 § 9, at 1400, which provides that the prisoner "has the right to
appear in person at the hearing."
94 N.J. RULES 3:10A-11 (Supp. 1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.620 (1961).
95 0mo REV. CODE § 2953.24. Compensation is fixed by OHIO REv. CODE
2941.51, which provides that in cases of first or second degree murder or manslaughter,
assigned counsel may be awarded such compensation and expenses as the court may
approve. In all other felony cases, compensation is not to exceed three hundred dollars
and expenses approved by the court.
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Only ten states"8 have similar provisions, and in only a few of these
states is the appointment mandatory." It would appear, then, that
in most states a prisoner who does not request the assistance of
counsel in his petition might waive his right to such assistance.
Further, since the proceedings under all of the statutes and rules are
collateral in nature, the language in Douglas v. California' would
probably not require the states which have included no provisions
on this point to do so.
The role played by assigned counsel varies widely. For exam-
ple, in New Jersey the attorney is encouraged to argue the merits
vf the petition no matter how frivolous its allegations may appear
to be." In Oregon, however, the otherwise unconditional right to
a hearing is qualified by a provision which requires the assigned
counsel to inform the court of his impressions of the merits of the
case, which information may be taken into consideration at the
hearing.
1°°
F. Judgment and Appeal
All the states, including Ohio, expressly provide that in the
event the court decides that petitioner's allegations are meritorious
he may be awarded any relief appropriate under the circumstances.'
In addition, a judgment rendered pursuant to an application for re-
lief is final in all respects and may be appealed by the petitioner or
the state.0 2 Although not all of the statutes and rules contain
specific provisions on appeals by the state, there are provisions to
96ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1964); KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5506 (1964); MD. RULES BK42; Neb. Laws 1965, ch. 145, S
4, at 487; N.J. RULES 3:10A-6 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-219 (1965);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.590(3) (1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.4 (Supp. 1965).
97 Ky. R GI P. 11.42; MD. RULES BK42; N.J. RULES 3:10A-6 (Supp. 1965);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.590(3) (1961). In Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Oregon, however, there must be an allegation of indigency in the petition to justify
the appointment. Further, in Maryland the appointment of counsel is mandatory only
on the first petition. Additional petitions may be filed but counsel will be appointed
only if the claim presented is deemed meritorious.
98 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See McCartney v. United States, 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 848 (1963). See note 105 infra.
9 9 NJ. RULES 3:10A-6(d) (Supp. 1965).
100 ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.590(4) (1961).
10 1 OHO REV. CODE § 2953.21. See also ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35; KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1507 (1964). As to credit for time already served when the peti-
tioner is re-sentenced, compare COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35 (c) with State v. White, 262 N.C.
52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964).
102 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5508 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT.
138.650 (1961).
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the effect that appeals may be taken as in civil cases, which would
indicate a similar result." 3
The act provides that appeals may be taken pursuant to chapter
2505 of the Ohio Revised Code."0 4 Here again, the collateral
nature of proceedings under the statutes and rules has the effect of
excluding from the Douglas requirement (that counsel must be pro-
vided on appeal) the proceedings themselves and appeals from
judgments rendered.0 5
G. Findings of Fact
In the eyent that an Ohio court conducts a hearing, the act re-
quires that findings of fact and conclusions of law be made as to the
sufficiency of the allegations in the petition.0 6 The purpose of this
requirement is to enable a reviewing court to accurately ascertain
the reasons for the judgment.' This section is particularly impor-
tant in light of the requirement in Townsend v. Sain. that the dis-
trict court conduct a hearing de novo even though the issues have
been adjudicated in the state court if that court's findings and con-
clusions are not recorded and preserved.' The only states which
specifically provide that findings and conclusions are to be made in
all cases are those which expressly or impliedly recognize the peti-
tioner's right to a hearing."0 Most states, however, have provisions
similar to the Ohio section."'
103 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-7 (1964); Neb. Laws 1965, ch. 145, § 2, at 487.
104 0mo REv. CODE §§ 2505.01-.45.
10 5 In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963), the Cqurt said:
We are not here concerned with the problems that might arise from the
denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or man-
datory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims
have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court.
We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to
rich and poor alike. (Emphasis added.)
06 Oio REv. CODE § 2953.21.
1078ee Michener v. United States, 177 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1949).
108372 U.S. 293 (1963).
309 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314 (1963).
110M. RULES BK 45(b); N.J. RULES 3:10A-12 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-221 (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.640 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
7-408.6 (Supp. 1965). See also People v. Hamby, 32 IlM. 2d 291, 205 NXE.2d 456
(1965). The language of the Maryland rule dearly illustrates its purpose. "The
order shall include or be accompanied by a short memorandum of the grounds of the
petition, the questions, including specifically the federal and State rights involved, and
the reasons for the action taken thereon."
-"'See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35; DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRMB) R. 35; FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 1.
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H. Res Judicata and Waiver
In an attempt to minimize the number of repetitious and frivo-
lous attacks upon convictions while complying with the mandate
to provide adequate postconviction relief, several states have nar-
rowly circumscribed the right to the remedy available under the
statutes and rules enacted for that purpose. This has been achieved
by adding provisions which prohibit any reconsideration of matters
already adjudicated."' Toward the same end, other provisions have
been included under which all allegations not asserted in the
original or an amended petition are deemed waived." 3  These limi-
tations vary widely in scope and effect. For example, Oregon's
rather comprehensive statute is limited by its circular language re-
garding the doctrine of res judicata." 4  A postconviction hearing is
not available to a prisoner while the channels of direct review re-
main open to him, but no ground for relief may be asserted in a
petition filed pursuant to the statute which was or could have been
asserted on direct review. Thus, postconviction relief in the Oregon
courts would appear to be restricted to those petitioners who have
not filed a timely appeal or those who base their claims on newly
discovered evidence or a Supreme Court decision with retrospective
application." 5  On the other hand, the rule of court adopted in
New Jersey expressly states that only those matters which have been
previously adjudicated on the merits will not be considered in the
disposition of a petition."'
Closely allied with res judicata provisions are those which state
that all claims not included in the original or an amended petition
are deemed waived. Perhaps the most rigid application of this rule
is found in North Carolina. In that state, the waiver section as out-
lined above is supplemented by another provision under which the
withdrawal of a petition constitutes a waiver of all allegations in-
cluded." 7 Some states, however, have attempted to ameliorate the
"112 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 5507 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
645A(b) (Supp. 1965); N.J. RULES 3:10A-5 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
218 (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. 5 138.550(2) (1961).
113ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 5 122-3 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5507
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 645A(c) (Supp. 1965); N.J. RULES 3:1OA-4
(Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STA.T. § 15-217 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.550(3)
(1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.3 (Supp. 1965).
114ORE. REV. STAT. 55 138. 550(2),(3) (1961).
115 See Collins & Neil, The Oregon Postconviction Hearing Act, 39 ORE. L. REV.
337, 356-57 (1960).
"
6NJ. RULES 3:10A-5 (Supp. 1965).
11T N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-220 (1965). See also Pa. Laws 1965, No. 554, § 4(c)
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possible harshness of their waiver provisions. For example, the
New Jersey rule allows the court to disregard its waiver section
when "a denial of relief... would be contrary to fundamental jus-
tice or to the Constitution of New Jersey.""' 8
The act contains no express language regarding res judicata or
waiver. It is possible, however, to construe the provision that a
court need not consider successive petitions for similar relief by the
same prisoner' 10 as a tacit recognition of the two doctrines. In addi-
tion, the fact that an allegation was or could have been litigated in
an earlier proceeding could be the basis for the denial of a petition
for a hearing on the ground that "the petitioner is entitled to no
relief."' 20
It is worthy of note that most of the states which have included
res judicata and waiver provisions in their legislation or rules en-
acted those measures before Fay v. Noia'2' and Townsend v. Sabi 22
were decided. The Court announced in Fay that in the absence of
bad faith on the part of the prisoner, state procedural limitations
would not bind the federal courts in their consideration of applica-
tions for habeas corpus. In addition, the Townsend requirement,
that the district court conduct a de novo hearing when no determina-
tion of an allegation of a denial of federal constitutional rights has
been made in the state court and is not determinable on the face of
the record, is not dependent upon the reasons for the state court's re-
fusal to conduct such a hearing. Finally, Mr. Justice Brennan's re-
cent condemnation of "rigid and technical doctrines of forfeiture,
waiver, or default 1 21 makes clear the futility of unduly strict adher-
which provides that the failure to appeal an issue or to raise it in postconviction pro-
ceedings creates a rebuttable presumption that it has been waived.
118 N.J. RuLEs 3:10A-4 (Supp. 1965). See also ORB. REV. STAT. 5 138.550 (3)
(1961).
19 OHIO REV. CODE 5 2953.22.
120 Omo REV. CODE 5 2953.21.
121372 U.S. 391 (1963).
122372 U.S. 293 (1963).
12 3 Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 347 (1965). The Supreme Court's views
regarding the doctrines of res judicata and waiver in the lower federal courts were ex-
pressed in the case of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), which Mr. Justice
Harlan characterized as the last in the trilogy of "guideline decisions", citing Fay and
Townsend. In Sanders, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' denial
of a hearing to a petitioner who had failed to raise the ground relied upon in an earlier
proceeding under Section 2255. The Court stated:
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal
habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in
the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the
prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3)
the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the sub-
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ence to such provisions if the states are desirous of substantial
autonomy in their administration of criminal justice. 24
L Statutes of Limitations
The act specifically provides that a petition for postconviction
relief may be filed at any time. 25 Although most states 28 have
similar provisions, Illinois.27 and Wyoming'28 require that petitions
be filed within twenty and five years, respectively, of the prisoner's
conviction. In New Jersey, although a petition to correct an illegal
sentence may be filed at any time, other petitions for relief must be
filed within five years of conviction. "  In all these states, however,
the limitation may be waived by the court upon a showing of good
cause by the petitioner." °
The foregoing analysis was intended to explain and clarify the
provisions of the act in light of similar and dissimilar measures
effective in other states. With this background, it is now necessary
to examine the cases decided since its enactment in order to assess its
effect upon Ohio law to date.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The first judicial recognition of the act came one month after it
became law. In Kott v. Maxwell,'3' the petitioner applied to the
Franklin County Court of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his
federal constitutional rights. The court held that the new law pro-
vided an adequate and orderly procedure by which claims such as
those advanced by petitioner could be adjudicated in the trial court.
Further, it was pointed out that the court's original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus was not affected by the act. "However, until a peti-
sequent application.... Should doubts arise in particular cases as to whether
two grounds are different or the same, they should be resolved in favor of
the applicant. Id. at 15-16.
124 Illinois is typical of the states which have taken a more liberal view of their
statutes' res judicata and waiver provisions. See People v. Hamby, 32 Ill. 2d 291, 205
N.E.2d 456 (1965); People v. Cage, 58 IM. App. 2d 262, 207 N.E.2d 732 (1965).
125 OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.21.
126ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Supp. 1965);
127 Ibid.
128
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.1 (Supp. 1965).
129 N.J. RULES 3:10A-13 (Supp. 1965).
130 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Supp. 1965). Cf. Stevens v. Ragen
244 F.2d 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957).
13 Ohio App. 2d 337, 210 N.E.2d 746 (1965).
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tioner has exhausted the immediate and direct remedies available to
him under the provisions of Amended Senate Bill No. 383 in a case
such as this, justice will usually be best served in the trial court."'82
The Kott case left unanswered the question whether habeas
corpus would be available to a prisoner whose petition for relief
was denied by the sentencing court. The court's reference to the
fact that the act did not abrogate its original jurisdiction in habeas
proceedings indicated that the writ might issue if the trial court
abused its discretion in denying a hearing. This question was indi-
rectly answered in Freeman v. Maxwell.188 In that case the Kott
rule was extended to habeas applications which had been pending at
the time the act became law. The court stated that infringement of
constitutional rights had recently been made a ground, for habeas
relief only because no other adequate remedy was available for the
adjudication of such claims in Ohio courts. With the enactment of
Amended Senate Bill No. 383, however, the reason for enlarging
the scope of matters cognizable under the writ no longer existed.'
The implication was dear, therefore, that the writ would issue only
on its traditional grounds and not to review proceedings under the
act.
The first federal case decided under the act was Olney v.
Green. '8 Petitioner had been convicted of burglary in 1960. His
conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals and the supreme
court. In 1964, he applied to the sentencing court for a writ of
habeas corpus. His petition was denied and, because of the passage
of the act, the supreme court dismissed his appeal. On appeal to the
district court, petioner argued that it would be futile for him to file
a petition under the act because the trial court had already denied
him relief. The court disagreed, pointing out that when the peti-
tioner had filed his habeas application the trial court was restricted
to a consideration of jurisdictional defects only. The adoption of
the new procedure, however, removed this restriction and empow-
ered that court to hear and determine the sufficiency of his claims of
violations of his federal constitutional rights. Finally, the court
held that the creation in Ohio of an additional remedy by which
prisoners could challenge their convictions necessitated a dismissal
of the petition until such time as that remedy had been exhausted. 8 '
132Kott v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio App. 2d 337, 338, 210 N.E.2d 746, 747 (1965).
134 Ohio St. 2d 4, 210 N.E.2d 885 (1965).
13'- Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 5-6, 210 N.X.2d 885, 886 (1965).
1'5247 F. Supp. 368 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
33 6 Olney v. Green, 247 F. Supp. 368, 369 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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In addition to being the only case in which the basis of the
petitioner's claim for relief was an alleged denial of his state
constitutional rights, Porter v. Green8 . marked the first instance in
which an appeal was taken from the dismissal of a petition filed
pursuant to the act. Petitioner sought relief in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas for Coshocton County and claimed, inter alia, that he
had been convicted under a defective indictment which did not
charge an offense under the statute involved. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded because the petition "raised issues which...
entitle the prisoner to a prompt hearing thereon. The indictment is
certainly a part of the record of the case and must be considered at
that hearing."' 8
Finally, in the case of State v. Vaughn,"9 the defendant appealed
from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for relief on the
ground that he was not cautioned of his right to remain silent at
the time of his arrest and that his request for counsel had been de-
nied. In affirming the dismissal, the Hamilton County Court of
Appeals stated:
Before a hearing is had on such a petition, it must be shown to
the satisfaction of the judge, from such petition and the files
and records of the case, that a hearing is warranted. That is to say,
there must be some showing that the prisoner seeking relief be-
cause of a denial of his constitutional rights has, in fact, suffered
a denial of those rights or, at least, some matters must appear that
compel the trial judge to call for a full disclosure of the things
that did occur when the prisoner was accused of participating in a
crime.140
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
Although the cases in which the act has been interpreted or
applied have been correctly decided, all except Porter v. Green'
and State v. Vaughn 42 involved attempts by prisoners to obtain re-
lief in habeas corpus. Thus, whether the legislation will accomplish
the objectives which are obvious in light of the circumstances which
prompted its passage remains to be seen in future cases. In this re-
gard, two suggestions are offered which are directed toward produc-
ing the desired result of restoring finality to criminal judgments ren-
dered in the Ohio courts.
1374 Ohio App. 2d 336, 212 N.E. 2d 618 (1965).
138 Porter v. Green, 4 Ohio App. 2d 336, 338, 212 N.E.2d 618, 620 (1965).
139 7 Ohio App. 2d 154, 219 N.E.2d 211 (1966).
140 State v. Vaughn, 7 Ohio App. 2d 154, 155, 219 N.E.2d 211, 212 (1966).
1414 Ohio App. 2d 336, 212 N.E.2d 618 (1965).
1427 Ohio App. 2d 154, 219 N.E.2d 211 (1966).
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First, as previously indicated, the fact that the General Assem-
bly chose to enact statutory provisions nearly identical in substance
to the federal statute' 3 raises a question as to the effect the federal
interpretations of section 2255 will have upon the Ohio judiciary.
Considering the fact that the impetus to provide the relief available
under the act came from federal channels, it is likely that the legisla-
ture intended the Ohio courts to utilize federal precedent at least as
a guideline in their adjudication of petitions for postconviction
relief.
There is much to be said for such a course of action. The fact
that there has been legislative compliance with the mandate will not
be sufficient without effective judicial implementation. This can
best be achieved by the adoption of federal procedural practices and
standards for granting or denying relief under section 2255 by the
Ohio courts, preferably the supreme court. The "sound discretion"
of the district courts is much more likely to favor acceptance of the
state court's determination as final if that determination is consistent
with principles formulated by and binding upon the federal judi-
cary.144
Second, since the purpose of the act is to provide relief to all
prisoners whose claims are meritorious, serious consideration must be
given to the courts' criteria for ordering a hearing. In this regard,
the importance of the petitions filed in the sentencing court is dear.
Every effort should be made, therefore, to insure that the adequacy
of these petitions will be commensurate with their importance.
One possible drawback is that a majority of the petitions which
are filed have been drafted without legal assistance. Thus, a pris-
oner who has a meritorious claim may be denied relief without a
hearing simply because his petition is inartfully drawn or because
he has omitted some pertinent fact which he feels is unimportant. In
addition, in borderline cases - that is, where the court is in doubt
as to the sufficiency of the petition - the court would probably be
compelled to order a hearing to resolve the issues or have the peti-
tioner retreat to the district court. Both of these situations illustrate
14328 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964). For a discussion of the history of § 2255, see United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
144 The Supreme Court of Florida advised both the lower courts of that state and
members of the bar to apply and interpret the rule of criminal procedure adopted in
that state in a manner consistent with Section 2255. In Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So.
2d 825 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1963), the court stated: "We have supplied references to federal
precedent and authorities as a guide to the proper application and interpretation of the
Florida Rule." Id. at 828.
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the possible ineffectiveness and unnecessary delay that can result
because the court is uncertain of the tenor of the petitioner's claims.
A noteworthy method of insuring the uniformity and relevancy
of petitions for relief is exemplified by the practice currently in use
in the New Jersey courts and the district court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. In these states, all petitions for relief must be sub-
mitted on detailed forms which are made available to all prisoners.
By following simple instructions, the prisoner provides the sentenc-
ing court with specific information which is useful in the disposition
of his petition.145 Although the use of such forms is probably not
as effective as legal assistance with respect to the presentation of all
justiciable issues, they do provide a better basis for granting or de-
nying a request for a hearing than the sad letters full of irrelevant
information that the courts are likely to receive in their absence.
Finally, the question of when counsel should be appointed must
be considered. Although it has been held that a federal prisoner
does not have a constitutional right to be represented by counsel
at a hearing held pursuant to section 2255,14 in light of the im-
portance of the state adjudication with respect to the finality of the
judgment it is submitted that the Ohio courts should go further than
federal precedent requires in this regard by appointing counsel when-
ever a hearing is ordered.'47 Such a policy would be beneficial be-
cause it would result in a clear presentation of the issues involved
and because it would increase the likelihood that all claims the peti-
tioner might wish to make would be raised in one proceeding. In
addition, the expense of providing counsel is undoubtedly out-
weighed by the fact that the General Assembly's goal of finality in
state court adjudications would thus be sooner achieved.
145 The form petition calls for the following information: place of detention, name
and location of court which imposed sentence, indictment number and offense for
which sentence was imposed, date upon which sentence was imposed and terms of
the sentence, whether petitioner pleaded guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere, whether
the finding of guilty was made by a jury or a judge without a jury, appeals taken and
courts in which decided, results of appeals, reasons for not appealing, if any, grounds
for relief, supporting facts, any proceedings for collateral relief, if any, petitions for
state or federal habeas corpus, any petitions for certiorari, any other petitions, motions,
or applications, results of any proceedings named, any ground for relief that has not
previously been presented in a state or federal court and reasons for not presenting it,
whether petitioner was represented by counsel, and, if so, his name and address. Indi-
gents fill out an additional forma pauperis affidavit. See 33 F.R.D. 408 (1963).
146 McCartney v. United States, 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
848 (1963).
147 This practice was expressly approved by Mr. Justice Brennan in Case v. Ne-
braska, 381 U.S. 336, 346-47 (1965).
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V. CONCLUSION
The act represents a potential step forward in the administration
of criminal justice in Ohio. The question which must be answered
by future cases is whether the new legislation will be judicially im-
plemented in a manner that is consistent with the Supreme Court's
mandate, or whether Ohio prisoners will merely be delayed by its
presence in their quest for relief in the federal courts. The Ohio
judiciary would do well to remember the words of Mr. Justice
Brennan:
[TI]he possibilities for a healthy state-federal relationship in the
criminal field now repose very largely in the States themselves;
the Court has probably made its contribution. The future depends
upon the States' acceptance of the opportunity offered in the recent
federal decisions.' 48
OWEN L. HEGGS, JR.
148 Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 945, 959 (1964). See
also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 453 (1965).
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